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GOVERNMENT SPEECH IN TRANSITION
HELEN NORTON"

In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,1 the Supreme Court offered its
clearest articulation to date of its emerging government speech doctrine. 2 After
characterizing contested expression as the government's, the Court then held3
such government speech to be entirely exempt from free speech clause scrutiny.
In so doing, the Court solved at least one substantial problem, but created others
that remain unresolved today.
The good news is that Johanns and related cases 4 provide a helpful and
important vocabulary for recognizing both the inevitability and the value of
government speech. Not only must government speak if it is to govern, 5 its
speech is often quite valuable to the public. For example, government speech
both informs members of the public on a wide range of topics 6 and enables them
to identify their government's priorities (and thus to evaluate its performance). 7
For these reasons, the government speech defense appropriately insulates the
government's own expressive choices from free speech clause challenges by
private speakers seeking to prevent or alter the delivery of the government's own
message.
t Associate

Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School
of Law. My thanks to the South Dakota Law Review for its gracious invitation to participate in this
symposium.
1. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 553, 561-62.
4. For a brief history of the Court's government speech doctrine, see Helen Norton & Danielle K.
Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 904-10 (2010).
5. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1947) ("Now
it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even listen."); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 606 (1980) ("If government is to secure cooperation in implementing its
programs, if it is to be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about their needs .. .government
must be able to communicate.").
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964)
(government report describing the adverse health effects of smoking).
7. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE ExPRESSION 698 (1970).
Participation by the government in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of
any democratic society. It enables the government to inform, explain, and persuade-measures
especially crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force.
Government participation also greatly enriches the system; it provides the facts, ideas, and
expertise not available from other sources. In short, government expression is a necessary and
healthy part of the system.
Id.
8. In Johanns, the entire Court agreed that private speakers can be compelled to pay for
government speech with which they disagree, emphasizing that an effective government requires that
taxpayers frequently fund government speech with which they quarrel. See Johanns,544 U.S. at 562; id.
at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The first point of certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government's power to
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Johanns thus solved a problem faced by a number of lower courts that, up
until that time, had no vocabulary for dealing with what we now understand as
government speech. Indeed, before the emergence of the government speech
doctrine, lower courts often struggled mightily by seeking to apply some sort of
forum doctrine to what are really government speech problems. In other words,
lower courts too often tried to pound the square peg of what we now understand
as government speech into the round hole of public forum doctrine 9-with
confusing and unsettling results.
An example helps illustrate this point. In Griffin v. Departmentof Veterans
Affairs' -a decision that predates Johanns-the Fourth Circuit purported to
apply forum analysis when rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the
Veterans Administration's ("VA's") refusal to fly the confederate flag over one
of its cemeteries.1 I Even though the court concluded that "[r]equiring the VA to
allow the Confederate flag to fly daily over Point Lookout certainly 'garble[s]
[and] distort[s]"' the agency's chosen message, 12 it had no government speech
vocabulary from which to draw. It thus strained to characterize the government
program at issue as a nonpublic forum, in which government remains free to
regulate private speech so long as its actions are reasonable and viewpointYet an honest assessment of the facts would acknowledge that the
neutral.
Veterans Administration's decision to fly the American, and not the
Confederate, flag over a Civil War cemetery is actually viewpoint-based, rather
than viewpoint-neutral. Thus forum analysis, if properly applied, would have
led the court to strike down the agency's actions. But once Johanns' articulation
of the government speech defense allowed us to understand that the Veterans
Administration's choice about which flag to fly over its property was the
government's own expression, this becomes a much easier and more
intellectually coherent decision: this was not a case in which the government
regulated private speech in some type of forum, but instead a situation in which
speak despite objections by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some
measure to putting the offensive message forward to be heard. To govern, government has to
say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the
government's voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out of the question.
Id. (footnote omitted). The majority and dissent differed vigorously, however, on the question whether
government must identify itself as the source of that speech in order to successfully assert the
government speech defense to the plaintiffs' free speech claim. See infra notes 14, 15 and
accompanying text.
9. Under this doctrine, courts first assess what type of forum has been created, and then determine
whether the government regulation can withstand the appropriate test. Speakers may be blocked from
traditional or designated public fora only when necessary to serve a compelling government interest and
the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). Government may limit or deny access to a nonpublic forum
only if its restrictions are reasonable and do not target speakers on the basis of their viewpoints. See id.
Government's ability to regulate private speech thus often depends on how we characterize the forum,
but one caveat remains constant: government generally may not regulate private speech in any type of
forum on the basis of viewpoint.
10. 274 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,537 U.S. 947 (2002).
11. See generally id.
12. Id. at 822.
13. See id. at 820-25.
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the government itself was speaking, and was thus free to make its own
expressive choices.
The bad news is that in solving one problem with its articulation of the
government speech defense, 14 Johanns and its progeny created others by failing
to identify any limits-or even a need for limits-to such a defense, despite the
protests of dissenting Justices. 15 Moreover, the Court's imprecision has led
many inaccurately to understand the Court to have created a "right" for the
government to speak, even though the government generally possesses no First
Amendment rights of its own. I6 Indeed, the Supreme Court's most recent
17
government speech decision in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Surnmum
misleadingly states that "[a] government entity has the right to 'speak for
itself. ' 18
Such language has emboldened some government actors to

14. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 563-64 (2005).
15. See id. at 578-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to require the government to
affirmatively disclose its authorship of the contested message in order to invoke the government speech
defense). See also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (objecting to
the majority's decision as "portend[ing] a bloated notion of controllable government speech").
16. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139-42 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment protects the press from governmental interference; it
confers no analogous protection on the Government."); MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS
42-45 (1983) (arguing that government does not possess First Amendment free speech rights); Randall
P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 150108 (2001) (arguing that, because the First Amendment is drafted as a constraint on government action,
recognizing government's own First Amendment rights is inconsistent with constitutional text and
purpose). This leaves legislatures free to enact laws limiting government speech-and they often do so.
See Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law With a Twist: When Government is the Speaker, Not the
Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 229-30, 260-61 (2011) (describing federal and state statutes that
constrain government speech in various contexts). Note that the Court has suggested that certain
institutions with unique communicative functions-such as universities or broadcasters-may have First
Amendment interests regardless of their public or private character. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (observing that universities' academic freedom is "a special concern
of the First Amendment"); Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998)
(noting public and private broadcasters' First Amendment interests in journalistic freedom). See also
United States v. Am. Library Assoc., 539 U.S. 194, 210-11 (2003) (declining to decide whether public
libraries have First Amendment rights); id. at 225-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to
recognize public libraries as First Amendment rightsholders).
17. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
18. Id. at 467. Here the Court inadvertently illustrates Professor Hohfeld's insightful observation
that the term "rights" is often used imprecisely to mean very different things. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied to JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-44 (1913) ("One
of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive statement, and the true solution of legal
problems frequently arises from the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to
'rights' and 'duties,' .... "). In Hohfeldian terms, government is better understood as possessing not a
right but a privilege to its own speech. See id at 55 ("A right is one's affirmative claim against another,
and a privilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of another."); Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld's First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 914 (2008) ("Existing First Amendment doctrine takes a
rather clear position with respect to the Hohfeldian structure: a First Amendment right is a right against
the government and only against the government."). The Summum majority's later references to
government's "freedom" to speak are more in keeping with this understanding and thus more accurate.
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 ("Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it
lacked this freedom .... A government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when
it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled
message.").
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misunderstand the government speech defense as a sword with which they may
pierce others' free speech rights, 19 when the defense is instead a shield from
certain free speech challenges by private parties who seek to interfere with what
Indeed, government bodies
is really the government's own expression.
increasingly assert government speech interests to claim "-and some courts are
permitting them to exercise-the power to punish private parties' speech that
[has not been shown to] threaten the government's ability to express its own
views." 2 ° Examples include public entities' efforts to invoke government speech
interests to justify not only the punishment of student expression in public
schools, 2 1 but also the exclusion
of peaceful dissenters from attendance at the
22
government's public functions.
Moreover, the shield should be smaller in size and scope than the Court has
suggested to date. As I have written elsewhere, the Supreme Court "has been
too quick to defer to public entities' assertions that contested speech is their own;
indeed, it has yet to deny the government's claim to speech in the face of a
As just one example, the Court's failure to limit the
competing private claim."
scope of the government speech defense-and thus the size of the shield-led to
its decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos24 that characterized the government's
expressive interest in controlling its workers' speech as extremely broad. By
treating public employees' speech delivered pursuant to their official duties as
the government's own expression that it may control free from First Amendment
scrutiny, the majority cut back dramatically on public employees' free speech
rights. 5 For example, the Garcetti Court concluded that because the
19. For a more general discussion of how recognizing certain actors as having "rights" over others
may "facilitate the subordination of the weak by the strong," see Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The
Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 720 (2011).
20. See Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government's Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2011) [hereinafter Imaginary Threats] (discussing examples).
21. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 Fed. App'x 852, 855-56 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a
public high school student's First Amendment challenge to her dismissal from the cheerleading squad
when she failed to cheer for a basketball player who she alleged had sexually assaulted her: "In her
capacity as cheerleader, H.S. served as a mouthpiece through which [the school] could disseminate
speech-namely, support for its athletic teams. Insofar as the First Amendment does not require schools
to promote particular student speech, [the school] had no duty to promote H.S.'s message by allowing
her to cheer or not cheer, as she saw fit.").
22. See, e.g., Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 4838682 at *1-2 (D. Colo.
Nov. 6, 2008), aff'd on other grounds, 593 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7
(2010) (asserting government speech interests to reject a First Amendment challenge by two individuals
who were forcibly ejected from President Bush's speech on Social Security that was otherwise open to
the public simply because they arrived at the event's parking lot in a car with a "No More Blood for Oil"
bumper sticker). For an example of a government's unsuccessful effort to assert the government speech
defense to justify the exclusion of peaceful dissenters from a public event, see Liberty & Prosperity
1776, Inc. v. Corzine, 720 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D.N.J. 2010).
23. Helen Norton, Shining a Light on Democracy's Dark Lagoon, 61 S.C. L. REv. 535, 536 (2010)
[hereinafter Shining a Light].
24. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that public employees' speech made "pursuant to their
official duties" receives no First Amendment protection from employer discipline).
25. I have catalogued Garcetti's disturbing legacy at length elsewhere. See Helen Norton,
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its
Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5, 14-15 (2009) [hereinafter ConstrainingPublic Employee Speech];
Norton, Imaginary Threats, supra note 20, at 1268; Norton, Shining a Light, supra note 23, at 546-47;
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government should be permitted to "exercise... employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created[,]" the First Amendment poses no
barrier to the government's punishment of its workers2 6who report dangerous or
illegal conditions when required to do so by their jobs.
limits to the
Although the Supreme Court has yet to identify meaningful
28
27
government speech defense, a number of commentators and lower courts
continue to try to do so. Indeed, some judges have declined to take the Court's
implicit invitation simply to defer to government claims to contested speech as
its own. 29 As just one example, those lower courts seeking to limit Garcetti's
reach may seek to distinguish it by questioning whether a public employee's
contested speech actually occurred pursuant to her official job duties, and thus
whether her government employer should have the power to control it as its

own. 30 Others may require the government transparently to disclose its
authorship of a message before permitting it to invoke the government speech
defense more generally.3 1 Whether such efforts will be successful in cabining
the scope of the government speech defense remains to be seen.
In sum, Johanns marked the Court's long overdue recognition of
ubiquity and importance of government speech, appropriately exempting
government's own expressive choices from free speech clause challenges
private speakers. On the other hand, the Court's failure to clarify that

the
the
by
the

government speech defense is a shield and not a sword-much less to define and
limit the scope of the defense (and thus the size of the shield)-has emboldened
some governments and courts to misappropriate the doctrine to punish
individuals for speech that does not encroach on the government's expressive
Norton & Citron, supra note 4, at 911-12. Note, however, that the trend continues. For example, the
circuits are now split as to whether Garcetti means that the First Amendment does not protect public
employees from retaliation when they refuse to obey their employers' orders to utter falsehoods when
speaking pursuant to their official duties. Compare Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45, 46, 48 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (applying Garcetti to hold that the First Amendment does not protect a public employee who
refused to sign an affidavit drafted by his employer that he believed to be false) with Jackler v. Byrne,
658 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the First Amendment did not permit a police department
to retaliate against a probationary police officer after the officer refused to retract his truthful report and
make statements that would have been false).
26. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 411, 421. See also Norton, ConstrainingPublicEmployee Speech, supra
note 25, at 13-16 nn. 45-53 (discussing cases).
When Speech is Both Private and
27. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who 's Talking? Disentangling
Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion,
Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005); Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REv. 587 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Norton & Citron, supra note 4, at 917-19 (discussing examples); Norton, Imaginary
Threats, supra note 20, at 1272-73 (same); Norton, Shining a Light, supranote 23, at 546-47 (same).
29. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority's position has the potential of permitting a
governmental entity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in its own govemmentally-owned channels so
long as the governmental entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact. What is to stop a
governmental entity from applying the doctrine to a parade? Or official events? It is nearly impossible
to concoct examples of viewpoint discrimination on government channels that cannot otherwise be
repackaged ex post as 'government speech."') (citations omitted).
30. See Norton, Shining a Light, supra note 23, at 546-47 (discussing cases).
31. See Norton & Citron, supra note 4, at 917-18 (discussing cases).
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interests. For these reasons, the legacy of Johanns in particular, and the
government speech doctrine in general, remains in transition.

